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AT a meeting of the Association Committee in Luxembourg on April 
25th 1972, the Maltese delegation expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the functioning and results of the EEC/Malta Association Agreement 
which commenced in April 1971. The delegation stated that although 
Malta had obtained substantial tariff concessions in the industrial sec-
tor, she was 'unable to take advantage of them'. The raison d'etre of 
the Agreement was to cosolidate and extend the economic and commer-
cial relations, between the EEC and Malta, by the harmonious develop-
ment of trade. This was made possible under the terms of Article 238 of 
the Treaty of Rome. 1 It was hoped that the Agreement would result in an 
extension of Malta's home market for industrial exports which would ab-
sorb the existing spare capacity within the industrial sector. It was al-
so seen as a natural extension of European integration, consolidating 
the political and economic interests involved. 
However just over one year after the inception of the Agreement the 
Maltese Government were asking for its extension. The Association 
Council met in Malta in June 1972 to review the performance in trade 
and to examine how the present agreement should be exploited to the 
full. The requests made by the Maltese Government fall into four cate-
gories: 
1. To include Malta among the beneficiaries of the Community's Gene-
ralised Preference Scheme. 
2. To modify the 'rules of origin' in order that they be less restrictive. 
3. To extend the Association Agreement to cover agricultural products 
of interest to Malta 
4. That the Community would provide technical and financial assistance 
to Malta in order that industrial efficiency may be improved. The 
·This study was completed in September 1972. 
1 Article 238 states 'The Community may conclude with a third country, or union 
of states, or an international organisation, agreements creating an association 
embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special proce-
dures. 
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government hopes that this increased efficiency will facilitate a more 
complete exploitation of the trade preferences provided by the exist-
ing agreement. 
These requests indicate that the Maltese economy was not 'ready' to 
take advantage of the preferential treatment afforded by the Agreement, 
or rather, that the Agreement itself was not properly geared to the most 
important needs of the Maltese economy. There has, of course been one 
major change in the international sphere since the inception of the Ag-
reement. Mainly the speed with which U.K. negotiations for membership 
of the EEC were concluded. The resenting threat of the removal of the 
Commonwealth Preference Tariff was guaranteed to cause some anxiety 
in official circles. 
This paper examines Malta's pattern of trade, and industrial structure 
in the five years prior to the inception of the Agreement. We isolate the 
actual products that are eligible fo~ preferential treatment under the 
terms of the Agreement, and investigate the potential benefits to the 
Maltese economy of this treatment. We also examine the overall policy 
of the EEC towards the Mediterranean countries. 2 This involves a com-
parison of the terms of the EEC/Malta Association Agreement with the 
terms of EEC Association Agreements with other Mediterranean countr-
ies. We do this in the light of recent statements by the EEC which ex-
press dissatisfaction with the mixed bag of arrangements that exists at 
the moment e.g. ' .••••• The Commission considers that, taken as a 
whole, the agreements concluded with the Mediterranean countries are 
no more than an inadequate expression of Europe's interest in this re-
gion. Through these agreements the Community has so far made only a 
limited contribution to the economic development of this part of the 
world.'3 We suggest various ways in which the community can improve 
her limited contribution to Malta within the scope of existing policy, 
and conclude by considering the future economic development of the 
Mediterranean basin. 
RESUME OF THE TERMS OF THE EXISTING EEC/MALTA ASSOCIATION AGREE-
MENT 
The association Agreement is divided into two stages, both of five 
years duration. The first stage commenced in April 1971. It was en'li-
2 Excluding France and Italy which are members of the EEC. 
3 Commission Memorandum on: A Community Development - Cooperation Policy 
(Summary Document). Supplement - 5/71. Annex to the Bulletin of the European 
Communities 9/10-1971. 
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saged that negotiations for defining the terms of the second stage would 
commence eighteen months prior to the completion of the first five year 
period. Under the terms of the first stage, the Community has agreed to 
reduce by 70% its common external tariff rates on industrial products 
originating in Malta. The protective stranglehold of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy was the reason given for the exclusion of agricultural 
products. The reason given for the exclusion of petroleum products was 
the absence of a Common Community Policy on Energy. Reductions in 
tariffs on textiles are restricted to certain specific products, and only 
for a -limited tonnage of these products. 4 
In line with the reciprocity clause of Article 238, Malta agreed to a 
reduction of 35% in her tariffs on goods originating in the Community. 
This is to be effected in three stages; 15% on 1/4/71; a further 10% on 
1/4/73; and the final 10% on 1/4/75. A tail-piece is added, to the ef-
fect that by April 1st 1975 no product originating in the EEC will be at 
a competltlVe disadvantage vis-a-vis those products covered by the 
Commonwealth Preferential Tariff. There are some exceptions to this 
reciprocal action by Malta. These include specific protective tariffs 
and tariffs of a fiscal nature, whilst for some products reductions will 
be limited to the extension of the c.P. T .. Malta also reserves the right 
to re-establish, increase, or introduce duties against the E.E.C. for the 
purpose of protecting new and/or infant industries. The 'rules of origin' 
clause, agreed to by the contracting parties, restricts the tariff conces-
sions to products manufactured from raw materials wholly obtained in 
Malta, or any other member state of the EEC. If 'Third-Country' raw ma-
terials are used, the products concerned are not eligible for preferential 
treatmen t unless there is a change of tariff heading. 5 
There are no formal plans for the terms of the second stage, or for 
the length of its duration, except that 'in principle' it will be for five 
years. However, at the time of negotiations, there seemed to be a tacit 
agreement among the contracting parties that this second stage will 
culminate ie a complete customs un~on. Thus the duration of the second 
stage will depend on the rate of progress achieved in preparing Malta for 
the adoption of the Common External Tariff. 
·See p.56. 
5 There are some exceptions to this proviso. Some products will qualify even if 
there is no change in tariff heading; others will not qualify - even if they under-
go a change in tariff heading - unless there is also a specified minimum propor-
tion of value added or, in other cases, a change in-two tariff headings. 
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TRADE WITH EUROPE (INCLUDING THE U.K.) 1965-1970 
In 1970 83% of Malta's exports (value) went to Europe, and in return 
Malta received 84% of the total value of her imports from Europe. The 
predominance of Europe in Malta's pattern of trade is caused by geogra-
phical and historical factors. It is the nearest industrialised continent 
and has a large sophisticated market. History has also created a special 
relationship between Malta and the U.K. providing for preferential treat-
ment in trade between the two countries. The U.K. was Malta's most im-
portant trading partner in 1970, providing approximately 50% of all im-
ports from Europe, and consuming 54.4% of all exports to Europe. Table 
I shows that total imports have almost dOUbled over the six year period 
1965/70, (91%), while imports from Europe more than doubled during the 
same time period, (106%).6 The E.E.C. has provided a constant share of 
total imports from Europe, averaging 35% of this total, while EFT A has 
also maintained a steady average of approximately 56%. Thus in the 
six year period studied, the pattern of imports between the EFTA, the 
EEC, and Malta has remained fairly stable. It is reasonable to expect 
that these stable import trends will continue, except for the enlargement 
of the EEC total consequent upon U.K. entry in January 1973. 
Table I 
IMPORTS VALUE £OOO'S 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Total Imports 35,144 38,880 40,509 51,399 61,516 67,121 
Europe (Total) 27,134 30,296 32,741 43,039 50,737 56,013 
E.E.C. 9,392 10,635 11,608 14,470 17,693 19,576 
E.F.T.A. 15,228 16,802 17,392 24,756 28,721 31,094 
U.K. 13,655 15,232 15,803 22,560 26,195 28,123 
Continental EFTA7 1,573 1,570 1,589 2,196 2,526 2,971 
Rest of Europe 2,514 2,859 3,741 3,813 4,323 5,343 
EEC as % of Europe 34.5 35.1 35.4 33.6 34.8 34.9 
EFT A as % of Europe 56.1 55.4 53.1 57.5 56.6 55.5 
Source: COS Trade Statistics, compiled. 
6 We would like to express our gratitude to Mr. Edwin Causon of the Department 
of Trade for the compilation of these tables, and for the provision of statistics 
which were otherwise unavailable. 
7 Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden. 
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Table 11 
DOMESTIC EXPORTS 
VALUE £000' S 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Total Domestic Exports 8 6,199 7,645 7,159 10,205 12,506 12,212 
Europe (total) 4,358 5,229 4,818 7,506 9,907 9,705 
E.E.C. 1,216 1,378 1,269 2,461 3,846 3,843 
E.F.T.A. 2,641 2,886 3,082 4,653 5,506 5,489 
Rest of Europe 501 968 467 392 555 373 
U.K. 2,074 2,525 2,739 4,170 5,117 8,279 
Continental EFTA 567 361 343 483 399 210 
EEC as % of Europe 27.8 26.3 26.3 32.8 38.8 39.6 
EFT A as % of Europe 60.6 55.2 63.9 61.9 55.7 5.5 
U.K. as % of Europe 47.5 48.4 56.9 55.5 51.7 54.4 
Source: COS Trade Statistics, compiled. 
Table UI 
DOMESTIC EXPORTS BY SITC SECTION 1970 
VALUE £ 
SITC SECTION TOTAL OF WHICH 
E.E.C. U.K. 
---
o Food and live animals 776,440 497,522 193,455 
1 Beverages and tobacco 201,947 37,698 5,212 
2 Crude materi als 1,410,293 808,742 312,278 
3 Mineral fuels 
4 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 223,053 6,520 4,492 
5 Chemicals 195,623 2 510 
6 Semi manufactured goods 3,666,034 1,220,739 1,643,685 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 747,482 110,760 604,318 
8 Manufactured goods 4,977 ,736 1,159,277 2,505,842 
Source: COS Trade Statistics, compiled. 
8 Visible Exports only. 
52 
There has been a continued increase in exports to both the EFTA and 
the EEe. Over the six year period studied, exports to the EFT A in-
creased by 108% while those to the EEC increased by a remarkable 
216%. In direct contrast to this is the fall in outgoings to the rest of 
Europe, the 1970 total being 25.5% lower than that for 1965. These are 
mainly socialist countries of Eastern Europe. It is conceivable that, 
with a Socialist Government in Malta, this trend will be reversed espe-
cially due to the fact that more of the importing is now being carried out 
by the Government who can more easily 'trade' with the Eastern bloc 
than can a private businessman. 
In January 1973, when the U.K. joins the EEC, the community will 
be consuming more than 95% of Maltese exports. It seems likely that 
this percentage will increase if the countries of continental EFTA (i.e. 
excluding EEC) remain outside the EEC, since they have reduced their 
intake from Malta by 64% between 1965 and 1970. If some of these 
countries do join the EEC there is bound to be some reduction in total 
demand but this will not be marked. It is obvious that the enlarged EEC 
will play a crucial role in the development of the Maltese Economy. The 
increased size and sophistication of the European market will create a 
demand for certain products. This following section investigates how 
well adj usted the export sector of the Maltese economy is to take ad-
vantage of this demand, and its new, more competitive position vis-a-vis 
other non EEC countries. 
COMMODITIES ELIGIBLE FOR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
Within the context of the present agreement certain commodities bene-
fit from the full 70% tariff reduction, others are restricted by quota li-
mits, while others are ineligible for any form of concession. It is cru-
cial for the Maltese economy that the commodities which benefit are in 
value terms, produced by important growth industries. It is only if these 
industries are making a meaningful contribution to national prosperity 
in terms of increased employment and higher productivity that the Asso-
ciation Agreement will be of benefit to Malta. 
Table III provides a breakdown of Malta's exports in 1970 into groups 
classified according to the SITe. The two most important items, which 
comprise 71% of all exports are semi manufactured and manufactured 
goods. 
SEMI MANUF ACTURED GOODS 
The export of semi-manufactured goods is the second most important 
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bringing in a total value of £3,666,034, which was approximately 30% of 
total export revenue in that year. Although the section comprises forty 
one items, the bulk of the revenue comes from four types of commodities 
which account for £3,474,642 or 95% of the section total. Of these four 
items (Table IV), three qualify. for the full 70% tariff reduction; - rub-
ber, nylon yam and knitted fabric. Rubber articles are the most impor-
tant, having thrived on the preferential treatment afforded by the U.K. 
They are produced almost exclusively by one foreign owned company, 
and take the form of oil seals for automobiles. The company, which has 
a labour force of 1350, consisting almost totally of Maltese nationals, 
has considerable scope for expanding its production. It is a subsidiary 
of a large international group of companies, and thus already has a mar-
keting advantage within the EEC. In 1967 total exports of rubber to the 
EEC were £38,734, whereas this figure had more than·trebled to £117,769 
by 1970. In the one year since the inception of the agreement the com-
pany has not received any new orders which are 'directly attributable' 
to their new preferential position. 9 However, due to the techni~al nature 
of the product and severe competition from the Japanese, one year is 
probably too short a period to assess the effect of the tariff cut. 
Since the major market for cotton yarn is Canada, the tariff cut from 
15% to 4.5% is not expect~d to cause any large diversion of trade. In 
1970 Canada imported £215,596 of cotton, compared with £15,513 to the 
EEC and £9,447 to the U.K. In the case of knitted fabric Italy accounted 
for 95% of the total value of exports in 1970. The reduction in duty from 
20% to 6% will undoubtedly improve the products' competitive position, 
and possibly create some new trade with other EEC countries. The most 
important semi-manufactured export to the EEC is cotton yarn, which 
brought in £611,358 in 1970. This product is eligible for 70% tariff re-
duction but is restricted by a quota of 750 tons. Corton yam exports are 
also restricted by a quota under the U.K. Cotton Textile Arrangement of 
1966, resulting in only £160,000 going to the U.K. in 1970. However it 
was the intention of the U.K. to abolish this system and replace it by 
import duties of 85% of the full rate for exports of Commonwealth countr-
ies. This would have resulted in exports to the U.K. being subject to a 
tariff rate of approximately 6.4%, but no quota restriction. The strength 
of Malta's bargaining position vis-a-vis an increase in quotas, will de-
pend on the speed with which. the U.K. eliminates Commonwealth Pre-
ference after January 1973. Whatever the situation it seems certain that 
Malta has a case for an increase in the allowed quotas. Exports to the 
9 According to the Management. 
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EEC have been increasing steadily, partly caused by the need to find 
markets other than the U.K. An increase in quotas would be of consi-
derable benefit to the cotton yarn industry in Malta. 
MANUF ACTURED GOODS 
The most important section in Table ill is item 8, Manufactured Goods, 
which consists of 86 separate items. Textile articles predominate within 
this category, with fourteen major export items. Of the fourteen items 
listed in Table IV, four are subject to quota restrictions, nine are eli-
gible for the full preferential treatment, and one, namely printed books, 
is exported duty free. 
The items that receive an unqualified improvemen t in their com petit-
ive position are, textile gloves; leather gloves; nylon stockings; shirts; 
capes, coats etc., of furskin; footwear; dolls; smoking pipes; and wigs. 
Of these nine commodities, five have no previous record of trade with 
the EEC: 
Ca) The maj or receivers of textile gloves are Australia and New Zea-
land, although the U.K. did take £16,828 in 1970. This pattern re-
mained unchanged in the six years from 1965 to 1970. 
Cb) The existence of high tariffs and quota restrictions have apparently 
been the major obstacles to the creation of a nylon stocking trade 
with the EEC and the U.K. It seems that competition within the EEC 
is so severe that any imposition of a tariff will eliminate the de-
mand. Thus, even a tariff cut of 70% has brought no new orders from 
the EEC. 
Cc) Most of the shirts produced in Malta have been exported to develop-
ing countries. Although this commodity is eligible for the full tariff 
concession some of the manufacturers receive their raw cloth from 
'third countries' and are thus prohibited by the 'rules of origin' 
clause. The possibility of substituting raw cloth from EEC member 
states, at no increase in cost, is being investigated. 
Cd) Manufacturers of footwear have avoided the EEC because of high ta-
riffs and fierce competition. This severe competition will probably 
prevent any marked improvement in demand that might have followed 
from the tariff concession. 
Ce) The U.K. has been the maJor market for smoking pipes, but it is 
hoped that the new tariff of 5.4% will re-direct some exports to the 
EEC. 
Of the four products which have an existing market with the EEC, only 
two are of importance. Capes, coats, etc., of furs kin are allowed duty 
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free into the U.K., compared wi th the CET which stood at 24% in 1970. 
In 1970, the U.K. imported three times the value imported by the EEC. 
The 70% tariff cut is expected to result in an improvement in trade with 
the Community, but the 'rules of origin' clause may pose a problem. Ex-
POrts of dolls have revealed a steady increase, both to the U.K. and the 
EEC. The reduction in duty to 7.5% brings it below to 12% imposed by 
the U.K., and thus some improvement in the Community market is ex-
pected. 
Thus, of the fourteen textile items which make up the major proportion 
of the exports of manufactured products, the nine that are eligible for 
the full tariff cut contributed only £41,854 or 0.34% of the total export 
value in 1970. 
Quota restrictions of 300 tons maximum, severely handicap exports of 
the first three commodities listed in Table IV. Exports to the EEC have 
been steadily increasing, and it was the major market in 1970. The ma-
jor company concerned is anxious to increase its trade with the com-
Table IV 
EXPORTS OF SELECTED MANUFACTURED GOODS 1970 
Men's trouser, shorts and slacks 
Boy s' trousers, shorts and slacks 
Other outer garments, men's and boys 
Textile gloves and mittens 
Leather gloves 
Nylon stockings 
Shirts 
Cardigans and infants' garments 
Capes, coats etc. of furskin 
Footwear 
Printed books 
Dolls 
Smoking pipes 
Wigs 
Source: COS Trade S!~~tistics. compiled. 
56 
TOTAL 
1,588,042 
103,577 
516,149 
89,549 
137,829 
69,694 
32,606 
438,531 
69,846 
106,007 
230,431 
94,386 
38,335 
43,478 
VALUE £ 
OF WHICH 
E.E.C. U.K. 
--
710,833 361,200 
5,835 
162,755 316,687 
11,828 
2,828 89,914 
2,402 
42,448 317,023 
17,325 51,231 
70,724 
6,094 169,176 
20,446 56,838 
34,325 
1,255 40,809 
munity and is hoping for an increase in the quotas, when renegotiations 
take place. Exports of cardigans and infants garments to the EEC, in-
creased three-fold between 1967 and 1970. It seems obvious that the 100 
tons quota limit will seriously hamper the development of trade in this 
product. 
OVERALL EFFECT 
The previous statistics suggest that the Association Agreement is not 
likely to have a profound effect on the Maltese Economy. The potential 
for trade creation is limited to isolated commodities, and is often ham-
pered by quotas or the rules of origin clause. In fact, the previous an-
alysis presents a somewhat optimistic picture, in that the restrictive 
effects of this 'clause' are not spedfically included. It is assumed that 
these restrictive effect.s will be essentially short-term, and that the com-
prehensive industrial infrastructure of the EEC will provide a substitute 
source of raw materials presently received from 'third countries'. Malta's 
industrial sector is such that the majority of export-oriented industries im-
POrt their raw materials. The main sources of these raw materials are 
the U.K. and the EEC. The inclusion of the U.K. within the community 
will remove its 'third country' status, and eliminate the need to switch 
to the EEC as an alternative source. It seems likely that this switching 
of sources would have occurred if the U.K. had remained outside the 
Community. It can be said, that the EEC countries produce competiti ve-
ly all the materials which Malta's export industries presently import from 
the U.K., therefore minimising the risk of preferential benefits for ex-
ported goods being offset by an increase in the cost of raw materials. 
Also, the bulk of materials used in exportable goods are imported duty 
free from any source, so that the U.K. has no preferential advantages 
over EEC countries in this respect. 
L\1PORTS 
In the case of imports to Malta, the basic aim of the Associafion Agree-
ment was to eliminate the preferential position of the U.K. It was as a 
direct result of the Commonwealth Preferential System and the historical 
links, that the U.K. provided 55.7% of total imports from Europe. The 
percentage share of the two groups has remained relatively stable, with 
the EEC providing 34.7% of the value of the same import total. It was 
envisa"ged that the progressive reduction of 35% in the Maltese tariff 
wouod eliminate the difference between the General and Commonwealth 
Preference rates, which is of an average of 15 percentage points. Thus 
by the termination of the first Agreement pe-riod the Preferential rate will 
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be equal to or even higher than that to the EEC. In the majority of items 
the duty charged on items imported from the U.K. and the EEC would be 
equal - mainly 13%, 15% and 23%. The inclusion of the U.K. within the 
EEC in January 1972 has made this largely academic, but it does not 
seem likely that there would have been a dramatic switching of imports 
from the U.K. to the EEC. Since the tariff reductions were phased the 
global effect would only have been felt after four years, and also the 
EEC would only have gained a position of equal competition. 
As was stated previously, the EEC are fully aware that they are only 
making a 'limited contribution to the economic development of the Me-
diterranean countries' .10 They admit that the hotch-potch of agreements 
signed with these countries are no more than an inadequate expression 
of Europe's interest in this region. The absence of an overall policy to-
wards the Mediterranean reveals itself in the inconsistency of the terms 
of these agreements. This inconsistency has been particularly unsatis~ 
factory in the case of the agreement with Malta. If the EEC is genuinely 
interested in making more than a 'limited contribution', then steps should 
be taken to eliminate these disparities. The following section highlights 
some of the disparities which are particularly relevant to Malta by con-
trasting its Agreement, with those between the EEC and other Mediter-
ranean countries. 
ASSOCIA nON AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
Juridicially the Agreements signed between the EEC and Mediterran-
ean countries can be classified into two categories: 
1. those signed on the basis of article 238 of the Treaty of Rome 11 
which contain the 'reciprocity' clause; and 
2. those based on article 113 of the Treaty of Rome which provides for 
the formation of a 'common commercial policy' after the transition 
period. 
Agreements falling in the first category are those signed with: Greece 
(9/7/61); Turkey (12/9/63); Tunisia (28/3/69); Morocco (31/3/69) and 
Malta (5/12/70). Those falling in the second category are: Lebanon 
(21/5/65);12 Yugoslavia (17/3/70); Israel (29/6/70); and Spain (29/6/70). 
However, if the agreements were to be classified according to their 
10 Se e footnote 3. 
11 See footnote 1. 
12Negotiations are in progress for a second agreement with Lebanon, since the 
first has elapsed. 
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economic features and implications a regrouping would be necessary: 
CATEGORY COUNTRIES 
B 
A Greece and 
Turkey 
C 
D 
E 
Tunisia and 
Morocco 
Malta 
Spain and 
Israel 
Lebanon and 
Yugoslavia 
FEA TURES AND IMPLICA nONS 
1. Large number of concessions, both m-
dustrial and agricul rural. 
2. Free movement of persons and _ services 
(consul tations on). 
3 .. Financial assistance provided. 
4. Long transition periods with adoption of 
CET. 
5. Full membership at termination of transi-
tion period, if beneficial. 
1. Agreement of 5 years with provision for 
renegotiations. 
2. Covers both industrial and agricul tural 
products. 
3. On industrial products, originating in Mo-
rocco & Tunisia, immediate freedom of 
entry into Community Market - free of 
restrictions as to quantity and free of 
customs duty or dues having an equiv-
alent effect, except for cork products. 
1. Agreement of 5 years with provision made 
for a second phase which is intended to 
pave the way for the establishment of a 
customs union between Malta and the 
EEC. 
2. Covers only industrial goods originating 
in Malta. 
1. Preferential Trade Agreements with pro-
vision made for renegotiation - in the 
case of Israel a specified date for rene-
gotiations established. 
2. Covers both industrial and agricul rural 
products, originating in Spain and Israel. 
1. Non-Preferential Trade Agreements. 
2. Providing for the most favoured nation 
treatment. 
- with the addition of technical aSSIS-
tance in the case of Lebanon. 
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- with special concessions for beef for 
Yugoslavia. 
Having classified the various agreements into five categories there 
follows a compariso~ of the concessions made. This comparison omits 
the case of Lebanon and Yugoslavia since these agreements do not con-
cern preferential treatment in trade. The case of Malta is taken as the 
point of reference i.e. the agreements in categories CA), CB), CD) are com-
pared to the case of Malta. 
The products dealt with are divided into two groups: 
1. Agricultural Products 13 
2. Energy Products - in this context meaning Petroleum products cov-
ered in B.T.N. ch. 27. 
Industrial products are omitted from discussion in this section since, 
as shown in the first part of the article, it is these products which real-
ly form the subject of the Malta-EEC agreement and practically all 
these products are included in the tariff concessions. 
1. Ca) The EEC - Greece Association Agreement provides for the 
harmonization of both parmers' agricultural policies, at the latest, by 
the end of the transition period. Until such hatmonization takes place, 
the products listed in Annex III of the Association Agreement benefit 
from the general rules concerning the elimination of customs duties, im-
port quotas and dues, and measures of equivalent effect contained in the 
Agreement. Annex III covers such products as dried grapes, olive oil 
and preserved olives and citrus fruits, which are some of Greece's most 
important export products. Protocol 14 of the same Agreement provides 
for special treatment for Greek wine in the Community market. 
A somewhat similar situation exists with regards to Turkey. The 
EEC - Turkey Association Agreement provides for three stages: a pre-
paratory stage, a transitory stage and a definitive stage. During the 
first stage, agricultural concessions were given for specific products. 
But with the signing of the Additional Protocol, 14 a tran sitory period of 
22 years has been provided for, over which, Turkey shall seek to adjust 
its agricultural policy with a view to adopting the Common Agricultural 
Policy by the end of the period. Still, at the beginning of the transitoty 
stage, as shown in Annex 6 of the Additional Protocol, concessions giv-
13 See Appendix. 
14 Signed 23rd November 1970. The preparatory stage came to an end 1/9/71 and 
until the Additional Protocol comes into force an Interim Agreement - which 
was supposed to expire on 30/9/72 but has been extended - is effective. 
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en vary according to product or group of products; with. concessions co-
vering such important foreign exchange earners as hazel nuts, olives 
and capers, olive oil, dried figs and citrus fruits. 
(b) In the case of Morocco, Tunisia, Spain and Israel, products 
contained in Annex IT of the Rome Treaty (this Annex covers the pro-
ducts subject to the Common Agricultural Policy) are excluded from the 
concessions made in the respective agreements. But in all four cases 
important exceptions are made. Tariffs applicable to the import of citrus 
fruits into the Community from these countries have been reduced. For 
the export of olive oil from Morocco, Tunisia and Spain a reduction of 
the variable levy applicable on import into the Community has also been 
conceded. Other agricultural products originating in Spain and Israel be-
nefit from various reductions, with a 100% reduction in CET for lobsters 
originating in Spain. As regards certain fish and fish products originat-
ing in Morocco and Tunisia tariff quotas have been allocated for ex-
ports to Germany and Italy, whilst the already existent privileges ob-
taining on the French market were retained. 
Products listed in Annex II of the Rome Treaty are also excluded from 
the EEC/Malta Association Agreement, but unlike the other agreements 
mentioned above, in Malta's case there are no exception. This may be 
justified by pointing to the fact that agricultural products have not play-
ed a predominant part in Malta's trade with the EEC. However, the EEC 
imports the largest part of Malta's export of potatoes, with over 90% 
going mainly tc! Belgium and Holland in 1971. The EEC also imports a 
considerable portion of Malta's exports of wine. The favourable climatic 
conditions plus more intensive systems of cultivation can make the ho-
rticultural industry into an important growth sector in Malta's economy. 
For a number of years, the export of tomatoes, cut flowers and buds, and 
horticultural plants has been significant. The EEC, so far, has proved 
to be a limited and unstable market for these products whilst the U.K. 
has turned out to be the chief importer. The EEC could have provided a 
stimulus to this industry via the giving of trade concessions, but it was 
prevented from doing this by its static policy of basing these conces-
sions on past export performance. The entry of the U.K. into the Com-
munity in January 1973 will pose a further problem in that at present it 
is the most important market for the island's agricultural exports. A re-
vision of the terms of the Agreement is thus inevitable unless local pro-
ducers are to be placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis competitors from 
Southern Italy. 
2. The EEC does not, as yet, have a Common Energy Policy. How-
61 
ever, the numerous discussions and decisions of the Council and the 
Commission indicate that the formulation of such. a policy is being giv-
en priority. Given that approximately two thirds of the EEC's energy 
supplies are imported, a common policy is essential. Trade in energy 
products is a particularly important component of the EEC's trade with 
Mediterranean coun tries. IS In fact 45% of all the exports from ~fediter­
ranean countries to the EEC in 1970 were Petroleum products. 
In the case of Greece, Petroleum Products are included within the ge-
neral terms of the Agreement. Turkey and Spain were respectively given 
an annual tariff quota of 200,000 tons,16 and 1,200,000 tons. 17 For Mo-
rocco and Tunisia a guaranteed effective annual tariff quota (at zero ta-
riff) of 100,000 tons was allocated. 18 Beyond this amount customs duty 
may be levied in the case of strains on the Community market. It should 
be noted that a condition placed on these concessions was that they 
may be altered consequent to decisions relating to the EEC commercial 
policy and to the drawing up of a Common Energy Policy. Only Israel 
and Malta have not been given any concessions for Petroleum products. 
In Israel's case this is a direct disadvantage since it does actually ex-
port petroleum to the EEC - to the value of $U.S. 17 million in 1970. 
For Malta the disadvantage is only an indirect one. Malta does not have 
an oil refinery nor does it possess known Petroleum resources. How-
ever two major oil companies are prospecting off the Maltese coast, and 
it seems that chances of success are quite high. At present all petrol-
eum products are excluded from the Agreement, with the exception of 
EEC exports to Malta of lubricating oils and greases which receive a 
14% tariff cut. It seems advisable that provision should be made for the 
inclusion of petroleum products within the terms of the Agreement, if 
and when they materialise. 
In the case of Agricultural products, the reason given for their ex-
clusion from the A5reement was the prohibitive rules of the Common Ag-
ricultural Policy. The reason given for excluding Petroleum products 
was the non-existence of a Common Energy Policy. 19 Both factors, as 
15Here, Mediterranean Countries, with the exception of France and Italy, are 
taken to mean all Mediterranean Basin countries and not only those signatories 
of Agreements with the EEC. 
16 At zero tariff for Turkey. 
17Tariffs to be equal to CET reduced by 60% by 1/1/73 for Spain. 
18 The products covered by these tariff qUOtas are those under CCT headings: 
27:10, 27:ll, 27:12, 27:13, 27:14, with the specifications as to certain sub-
divisions for Turkey and Spain. 
19 ~falta Government White Paper 19/10/70. 
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seen above were of no hindrance in other agreements. 
The previous classifications indicate clearly the heterogeneons rela-
tionships existing between the EEC and the Mediterranean. The nature 
of the Agreements signed are directly linked to the commercial and poli-
tical ties existing prior to such agreements, to the political atmosphere 
at the time of negotiating, and to the commodity content of the exports 
of the countries involved. It can be seen that the concessions given to 
Greece and, to a certain extent, Turkey, were more generous than those 
given in later agreements. This is especially true of agricultural pro-
ducts. Since the Common Agricultural Policy was still in its infancy, 
and the Six probably did not foresee how complex its mechanism could 
get they were ready to grant more concessions than were possible later. 
Tunisia and Morocco, being ex-French Colonies, and hence historically 
dependent on the French market, have also been gran ted generous con-
cessions, covering practically all products. The policy of basing con-
cessions on past export performance, although politically neutral, tends 
to be economically static, in that it does not necessarily encourage eco-
nomically static, in that it does not necessarily encourage economic 
growth. If the EEC are sincerely interested in promoting development in 
backward countries they must gear their efforts to fostering potential 
growth sectors in these economies. This will in vol ve an in tensi ve eco-
nomic study of each coun try, and of the prospects of adj usting the eco-
nomies of these countries to trends in the E.E.C., and the world, mar-
ket. Trade concessions, although normally tending to increase the a-
mount of foreign exchange earnings of developing countries do not ne-
cessarily foster their growth. Developing countries are notorious for 
their high marginal propensities to import, especially of manufactured 
products. This problem is aggravated by the fact that these products are 
mainly articles of conspicuous consumption, such as cars, and tran-
sistor radios. This situation is more likely to occur if a general form of 
reciprocity is sought by the developed countries party to trade agree-
ments i.e. the increased demand for imports following from the rise in 
foreign earnings will be amplified by the lowering or removal of import 
tariffs. As we have seen above, 'reciprocity' is an integral part of those 
EEC Association Agreements signed under the terms of Article 238 of 
the Rome Treaty. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN 
The existing system of Agreements between the EEC and the Medi-
terranean countries concerned is a fragmented one. If the EEC persists 
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in its recent attitude of identifying the Mediterranean as a region, then 
a more consistent and positive approach has to be taken in its relations 
with this area. 
The Mediterranean 20 is a developing area with many of the character-
istics of backward economies. It is also a very heterogeneous area with 
significant variations in the level of development and social infra-
sttuctures of the various economies. 
From the commercial point of view the Mediterranean's relations with 
the EEC are rather disturbing. The European Community, which .runs a 
deficit vis-a-vis developing countries in general, is running a surplus 
vis-a-vis the Mediterranean Countries. This situation seems to be set-
tling into a trend, as shown in Table V. 21 
The productive structure of the Mediterranean economies is not very 
diversified with the result that the bulk of trade with the EEC consists 
of a few, mostly primary, products. Petroleum made up of 45% of Medi-
terranean exports to the EEC in 1970. Four products, raw cotton, wine, 
olive oil and citrus fruit together made up 25% of the remaining 55% of ex-
ports. Often the bulk of exports of the particular countries consists of 
very few products. It seems that only Israel and Lebanon have a wide 
range of exports. 
A di stur bing factor is the increasing deficits of Greece and Turkey 
both of which have had an association agreement wi th the EEC for many 
years. In the case of Turkey this deficit doubled over the space of five 
years 0966-1970) while in the case of Greece it increased by about 30% 
over the same period. Meanwhile the outflow of workers from the Medi-
terranean countries to the EEC continues. This flow of labour conveys 
benefits in that it alleviates unemployment problems in the Mediterran-
ean while also proving to be a significant <source of foreign exchange in 
the form of remittances by these workers to their domiciled families. But 
it is certainly creating social problems in both the countries of emigra-
tion, and the areas of immigration. Besides, this flow of labour, is de-
pleting the Mediterranean countries of some of the most enterprising and 
skilled members of its labour force. 
The agreements under discussion here contain no provisions concern-
20 In this context Mediterranean countries means all the Mediterranean Basin 
countries excluding France and Italy. 
2IThe largest relative deficit is that of Malta with the EEC. 
22Libya is a special case since the boost in exports it is experiencing is due to 
the extensive resources of oil in that country. These exports are almost ex-
clusively of Petroleum. 
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ing cros s relationships wi thin the Mediterranean area. It may be argued 
that it does not rest with the EEC to take the initiative in encouraging 
the Mediterranean countries to co-operate amongst themselves. But to a 
certain extent such economic co-operation is implicit in defining the 
Mediterranean basin area as a region. The European Community could 
certainly help the Mediterranean countries take the initiative by ration-
alizing the existing agreements with these countries. Given that econo-
mic conditions in the Mediterranean basin vary quite significantly, the 
term economic co-operation needs further qualification. It would seem 
feasible to propose close economic co-operation between countries with 
similar economic and political features, within the scope of a broader 
system of co-operation with the rest, whilst a revised relationship is 
maintained with the EEC. 
On the broader base of co-operation, trade in industrial products can 
be encouraged by a certain amount of freeing of trade within the Medi-
terranean area. An obstacle in the way of such co-operation lies is the 
provision which the EEC made in all trade find association agreements 
regarding most favoured nation treatment. The EEC and its Mediterran-
ean partners grant each other most favoured nation treatment. This treat-
ment makes it impossible for Mediterranean countries to reduce tariffs 
and other restrictions on trade with each other, without giving the same 
preferences to the EEC. Exceptions to this provision are to be found in 
the agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Spain and Israel where this clause 
can be overruled in the case of the formation of a customs union or a 
free trade area involving these countries. But it might not be feasible to 
the forma tion of a customs union or a free trade area, and a partial re-
duction of tariffs and elimination of other trade restrictions might be all 
that is required. Most of the Mediterranean countries were still only a 
colony only a decade or so ago. Hence it is unlikely that they will be 
attracted by arrangements that would seem to remove their new indepen-
dence. Hence, effectively, this can hardly be considered as a relaxation 
of the most favoured nation clause in face of the wide variations exist-
ing in the Mediterranean. What is more in line with the needs of this re-
gion is the joint declaration of the Final Act concerning Art. 17 of the 
Interim Agreenlent that came into force wi th Turkey on 1/9/71. This pro-
vides for an exception to the most favoured nation clause in the case of 
economic co-operation between Turkey and other developing countries 
and in the application of Regional Cooperation for Development. 23 The 
23R.C.D. is a system of economic co-operation existing between Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan. 
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existing situation in the Mediterranean brought about by the signing of 
agreements with the EEC, is far from an optimal one. For what is hap-
pening is that Medi terranean countries are removing trade barriers with 
the European Community and maintaining them with the other Mediterran-
ean countries. Generally speaking, Mediterranean markets are less so-
phisticated than the European Community ones, and firms located in the 
Mediterranean area are often less efficient than firms located in the 
EEC. The outcome is that EEC firms often find it easier to sell in the 
Mediterranean, than vice versa. This is one of the causes of the con-
tinued increase in the trade deficit of the Mediterranean with the EEC. 
The European Community can help to foster economic growth within the 
Mediterranean area by adopting similar p'rovisions as those existing in 
the Final Act of the Interim Agreement with Turkey. 
The EEC could further foster the region's growth by waIVIng its strict 
rules of origin. As things now stand, products exported by the Mediter-
ranean countries, partners to Association Agreements, qualify as ori-
ginating in the country of export only if the raw materials used are ob-
tained in the country concerned aT from the European Community itself. 
In several cases these raw materials can be obtained from the Community 
at competitive prices but this is not necessarily always the case. Medi-
terranean countries may, at higher prices, still obtain their raw material s 
from Communiry sources as long as the benefits are not totally eroded. 
Where such cases arise, we are faced with trace diversion, sometimes to 
the detriment of developing countries. The EEC can help to avoid this 
trade diversion problem by waiving the rules of origin in the cases where 
raw materials are obtained from other l\fediterranean countries (or for that 
matter from other developing countries) at lower prices than those ruling 
in the Community. 
In the case of countries with similar economic features and levels of 
development, closer links could be sought. In this case sectoral indus-
trial co-operation 24 could be feasible; especially for the smaller eco-
24 Sectora I industrial co-operation has proved to be fairly successful within the 
L.A.F.T.A. By 1971 something like sixteen of these agreements have been 
signed involving various countries and sectors. The main aim of this co-opera-
tion is to achieve industrial complementarity by creating adequate conditions for 
the promotion of investment in a form which avoids destructive competition. 
These agreeme nts are directed towards: Ca) the extension of the process of im-
port substitutions; Cb) the full utilization of productive capacity; and Cc) bene-
fits from economies of scale. U.N.C.T.A.D.'s 'Current Problems of Economic 
Integration' U.N., New York, 1971. 
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nomies with limited resources. The case of Malta and Cyprus 2S could 
serve as an example. Both countries are small, densely populated, and 
resource poor islands, but with relatively high incomes per capita. Due 
to their small size and lack of resources, they are not likely to be able 
to benefit from large scale production if they individually attempt to es-
tablish complete production processes. It would seem more feasible for 
each to specialize in only part of the production process of any particu-
lar good, leaving the remaining stages for the other. This would ensure 
that the overall value added is maximized whilst the benefits of large 
scale production are reaped. These advantages would be increased by 
the economies that would result from the improvements in marketing, 
bulk buying of raw materials and better transport facilities associated 
with large scale production. Such an arrangement would certainly neces-
sitate a high degree of co-operation between the countries concerned but 
would still allow for flexibility. The EEC could help similar arrange-
ments by reducing the risk of such joint-operations by giving conces-
sions to these products, so that they could compete on its markets with-
out ha ving to face discriminatory tariffs or other trade restrictions. Re-
ciprocity should not be sought by the EEC until the economic environ-
ment in the developing partners concerned is well established enough to 
bear it. 
The" absence of a co-ordinated policy with the Mediterranean countries 
has lep to continued deficits in their trade relations with the EEe. The 
basis of the piecemeal policies that exist is Article 238 of the Rome 
Treaty, which was more inspired by a desire for a political grouping 
rather than a need to foster economic growth. Article 238 was drawn up 
at a time when the ideas of 'the most favoured nation' clause and re-
ciprocity in trade concessions, ruled supreme in G.A. T.T. But today, 
after three conferences of D.N.e.T.A.D., experience has created disen-
chantment wi th the value of these two toncepts in relations between 
developed and developing countries. The EEC has taken upon itself a 
political commitment towards the Mediterranean. A commitment which is 
understandable in the light of history and geographic proximity, as well 
as by the volume of trade linking the two regions. Hence a revitalisation 
of Article 238 is required, which besides embracing political aims, would 
also accept economic realities. Development of the Mediterranean basin, 
25Cyprus is negotiating an Association Agreement with the EEC which is ex-
pected to lead in two stages to the formation of a Custims Union berween the 
conrracting parties. 
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as already recognised by the EEC Commission, would benefit both the 
EEC and the Mediterranean in the long run, and should be regarded as a 
natural extension of European integration. 
Since the wrItlng of the article the EEC has signed agreements with 
Cyprus, Lebanon and Egypt, all of which have come into effect after J an-
uary 1. Turkey has now entered into the second stage of its association 
also since January 1 (it took the Communi ty national parliaments two 
years to ratify the Additional Protocol). 
At the end of September 1972, the Commission issued a communica-
tion to the Council on 'Relations between the Community and the Coun-
tries of the Mediterranean Basin' which seeks to coordinate the Com-
munity's policy towards the area. This document proposes the establish-
ment of a free trade association between the EEC and the Countries of 
the Mediterranean based on reciprocal concessions. 
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